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Abstract  
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  an  introduction  towards  the 
architectural  design  of  a  bi-fold  authenticated  agent-monitored 
transaction model. The focus is primarily on implementation in ATM 
systems which provide the following facilities of withdrawing currency 
at  any  remote  terminal,  verification  of  the  end  users  identity  using 
Personal  Identification  Number  and  an  authentic  One-Time-Session-
Dependent  Key  generation  and  validation  through  the  mobile.  This 
system  requires  building  up  of  an  third  party  agent  which  would 
establish a secure session to the bank application with the terminal only 
after a series of authentication mechanism without compromising the 
privacy of any individual. The customers, without any insider privileges, 
can withdraw currency without being detected by any mechanisms of 
theft of card and eaves dropping of the Password from the card holders 
within the terminal software are also a major threat yet to be addressed. 
A  basic  solution  is  the  terminals  having  bi-fold  authentication 
mechanisms where mobile dependent one time session dependent key is 
being generated with authenticity being ensured and the confidentiality 
being  maintained.  In  such  a  system,  the  correctness  burden  on  the 
terminal’s code is significantly less as the customers have been given the 
chance to authorize themselves from their hand-held devices and are 
allowed  to  withdraw  currency  in  terminal  only  after  their  identity  is 
proved by a series of authentication procedures. In this paper along with 
the bi-fold authentication implementation, architectural design of the 
agent which is being introduced is also briefed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The  need  for  authentic  transactions  of  any  form  has  now 
become  a  primary  focus  area.  Need  for  integrity,  authenticity 
together  with  the  confidentiality  is  now  being  enforced  for  any 
operations worldwide. The primary focuses are with respect to the 
ATM - Automated Teller Machine [5] as these system deals with 
the delicate matter of currency transfer. Automated Teller Machine 
is a system which has been installed to give money instantly to the 
customers at a lightning speed. ATM systems have been installed 
at various places across the globe by various financial institutions. 
These systems have been given the secure way of authentication 
by  providing  a  Personal  Identification  Number  (PIN).    PIN  is 
assumed to be kept secret by the ATM card Holder. This PIN will 
be asked from the customers when their card has been recognized 
by the terminal [1] [2]. So the process of authentication starts after 
the card is being sensed by the terminal and stops after the PIN is 
being entered in the terminal. As the possibility of means of eaves 
dropping  of  the  PIN  and  the  abuse  of  the  ATM  cards  have 
dramatically increased all around the globe, the need for further 
evolution  of  authentication  phenomenon  has  emerged  for 
replacement of the current existing procedures. This paper deals 
with an effective way of the handling such issues with an bi-fold 
authenticated  agent  and  also  the  architecture  that  is  being 
developed to implement such a system that could be more resistant 
towards  such  attacks  and  the  phases  which  ensures  the 
confidentiality associated with these delicate transactions are also 
maintained at the high stake. 
The  section  2  of  this  paper  deals  with  the  current  existing 
mechanism of the ATM Terminals and the existing procedure that 
is  being  followed  for  cash  withdrawal  in  the  ATM  Terminals. 
Section 3 of the paper deals about the proposed system design and 
methodologies and the section 4 introduce the concept of the agent 
and the internal architecture of the agent. Section 5 describes the 
failures and following section describes the remedies to the failure. 
Section  7  describes  the  various  functional  components  of  the 
proposed system and section 9 describes the various modules in 
the proposed internal agent and the section 10 about the phases in 
the proposed system. 
2. EXISTING SYSTEM 
There  is  increasingly  widespread  adoption  of  ATM  systems 
across the globe. ATM system across the globe is known for its 
famous instant cash delivery to the customers. Customers need to 
introduce  their  ATM  card  provided  to  them  by  their  financial 
institutions.  Also  they  are  supposed  to  provide  their  Personal 
Identification Number to complete their process of authentication. 
When their authentication is complete, the customer is allowed to 
select the type of transaction to be made by them - either balance 
enquiry  or  instant  cash  withdrawal.  The  authentication  of  these 
systems depends upon only the PIN secrecy and the well known 
fact of the current global situation is that the possibility of eaves 
dropping of the PIN has exponentially grown over the past few 
years. Need for enhanced architectural design of this mechanism 
arises  along  with  the  well  known  fact  of  maintenance  of 
confidentiality.  Also  the  entire  process  of  the  cash  withdrawal 
from the ATM Terminals is done with a help of single governing 
institute of that particular country, for example the Reserve Bank 
of  India  in  the  mainland  of  India.  The  governing  body  is  thus 
concerned only about the financial aspects and usage of the ATM. 
Many non-financial services could be achieved by the process of 
set up of a third party agent, which would help in making ATM 
used for many non-financial services. 
3. PROPOSED SYSTEM 
The ATM card and the PIN that is being currently being used 
by the existing system is  necessary along  with the user Mobile 
number  registered  officially  with  the  financial  institutions  that 
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figure that estimates the fact that almost all the populations who 
have their ATM card are also the user of at least a mobile, this 
technique  is  being  proposed.  Also  the  challenges  of  security 
associated are being addressed. The main issue of improving the 
authenticity is enforced in this proposed system. 
The user inserts the ATM card into the recognizing terminal. 
The terminal now senses for its validity. Then the terminal does 
not ask for the PIN number to be entered, instead sends the one 
time  Session-Dependent  Password  (SDP)  to  the  user  officially 
registered mobile number with the help of the agent. So first a 
temporary time-dependent session is established between the third-
party  agent  and  the  Terminal.  Agent  is  provided  with  only  the 
repository of valid ATM card numbers issued by all the financial 
institutions (perhaps the possibility of the need for one such agent 
per country arises) along with the mobile number associated with 
it. Thus the issue that is pertaining to the eaves dropping is now 
solved as the SDP is sent to only the officially registered mobile of 
the customers.  
 
Fig.1. Functional Unit of the proposed System 
The bank application is only now approached by the terminal 
after the session is successfully terminated between the agent and 
terminal  and  not  aborted.  So  now  the  bank  application  has  an 
extra-level of authentication about the customer that they are both 
authenticated and  validated.  Also the SDP and session between 
terminal  (ATM)  and  agent  is  time  dependent,  i.e.,  the  SDP 
generated  expires  five  minutes  and  provision  of  one  time 
regeneration of the SDP is also available in adverse case of the non 
reception of the SDP to the registered mobile.  
The mobile once misplaced shall be brought to the notice to the 
respective financial institution by the card holder so that the option 
of change of the mobile number might also be provided. There is a 
unique  back  end  computation  of  the  SDP  with  the  help  of  the 
trusted  third  party  agent  so  that  after  this  phase  only,  the  PIN 
number is asked to be entered by the customers. Once the SDP is 
verified, a secure session as in the existing system is then set up 
between bank application and the ATM machine for the instant 
currency withdrawal or for balance enquiry. A chance of entering 
the SDP sent to the user mobile is fixed to be three so that an 
additional  fold  of  authentication  is  also  ensured  and  a  leniency 
towards the end user misread the SDP is also achieved. 
The method for computation of the SDP is unique and it is 
based  on  the  Code  number  of  the  Branch  of  that  particular 
financial  institutions  and  four  digits  of  the  account  number 
selected at random followed by an four digit random number (it is 
chosen as four digit since the PIN is commonly a four digit secret 
Number). Also the SDP is asked to be entered only preceding the 
entry of mobile number from the Customer in the ATM terminal 
which provides another tier of authentication. The third party agent 
responsible for generation and verification of SDP is only given a 
read-only version of the customer’s account number along with 
their mobile numbers and refreshed periodically to add, drop and 
update  the  account  number  and  their  corresponding  mobile 
number. 
4. ARCHITECTURAL COMPONENTS 
The  functional  units  of  the  proposed  system  contain  the 
different stand-alone components along with an introduction of an 
agent which are needed to be interfaced in proper fashion to obtain 
the  desired  functioning  of  the  bi-fold  authenticated  agent 
monitored  transactions.  Architecture  depicts  the  various  stand 
alone components which has their specific functionalities which 
could be efficiently utilized by providing the requisite coordination 
among each others. The need for proper design of agent is more 
important  as  the  agent  plays  a  crucial  role  in  integrating 
authenticity with confidentiality.  
 
Fig.2. Internal Architecture of Agents 
5. FAILURES IN EXISTING SYSTEM 
Exploiting  the  lack  of  personal  weakness  of  the  customers, 
duplicating the role of a distinct individual, accessing customer’s 
personal  possession,  and  the  lack  of  an  internal  security 
mechanism [3] for the complete authentication phenomenon are 
the main failures in the existing system. An Important failure in 
the  existing  system  is  the  lack  of  the  complete  authentication 
phenomenon  in  the  ATM  terminal.  Any  individual  is  not 
completely authenticated before they are allowed to perform the 
transactions  in  their  ATM  terminal.  Their  authenticity  is  only 
determined  with  the  PIN  they  enter  in  the  terminal.  The  true 
verification of their identity with any other available means is not 
the concern of current ATM terminal.  As the exploitation of the 
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weakness of any individual customer has risen exponentially over 
past  few  years,  the  demand  for  multi-fold  distinct  and  unique 
authentication has occurred. 
6. REMEDIES TO FAILURES 
There is a secure complete authentication of the customer in 
the ATM terminal. The compete authentication is provided with 
the help of the generation of the SDP and transmitting it to the 
mobile number of the customer and allowing the customer to enter 
their the SDP received by their registered official mobile in the 
ATM terminal which is then preceded by the back-end verification 
of the SDP entered by the customers in the agent internals depicted 
in the architecture. All these process of SDP transactions between 
the  ATM  terminal  and  the  Agent  are  encrypted  to  add  an 
additional fold of security. 
The big advantage rested with these systems is that once the 
SDP  is  being  entered  wrongly  for  three  consecutive  times,  the 
transaction for that account number is temporarily blocked for next 
24  hours  and  there  is  no  session  established  between  the  bank 
application and the ATM terminal as all the transactions are dealt 
only between the customer and the agent. To resolve any adverse 
effect of discrepancies, the possibility of one time regeneration of 
the  SDP  is  also  facilitated.  To  facilitate  the  implementation  of 
these remedies to the failures along with the introduction of a third 
party application - agent, addition of encryption unit in the existing 
terminal (ATM) is required. 
 
Fig.3. Session Establishment Handshake message 
7. MODULES IN PROPOSED SYSTEMS 
Agent  is  a  trusted  third  party  application  which  has  a 
warehouse of only the Mobile number and ATM account number 
of the customers’ which is helpful in the recognition of the valid 
ATM account number of the user and transmitting the SDP to the 
respective  mobile  number  of  the  user  and  also  performs  the 
process of SDP verification. The architecture of the agent must 
cover  the  aspects  of  both  authentication  enforcement  and  the 
secure  transaction  establishment.  Any  mechanism  of  fraudulent 
action is being restricted by the SDP generation component as the 
session is established between the bank application and the ATM 
terminal  only  after  the  session  dependent  password  is  validated 
and verified. Agent has internally two software oriented module 
namely the SDP generation module, and Session Control Module 
(SCM). Agent needs to be commissioned country-wise across the 
globe as the norms and regulations differ amongst the countries. 
SDP  Generation  is  a  module  which  is  basically  a  software 
embedded  with  the  agent  to  generate  the  SDP  to  the  intended 
mobile of the users. It uses the warehouse provided and refreshed 
periodically  by  the  financial  institutions  which  holds  the 
information  about  account  number  and  their  respective,  mobile 
number. This is intended to generate a unique and non-repetitive 
SDP’s for different customers which can be treated as first level of 
the authentication provided at the terminal. After SDP generation 
it updates the secondary dynamic repository. 
 
Fig.4. Session Dependent Password Generation Module 
Session Control  module is responsible for the acceptance of 
encrypted session establishment handshake message and the SDP 
validate request encrypted session message from the terminal. The 
encrypted  session  establishment  handshake  is  depicted  in  the 
Fig.3. Once this message is received by the SCM it decrypts with 
its private key (EHA) - Ethernet Hardware Address and validates 
the  ATM  Account  Number  from  the  repository.  If  the  ATM 
account number entry is present in its warehouse then the SDP 
generation  module  generates  the  SDP  and  sends  SDP  Request 
message to the ATM Terminal. This SDP Request Message has 
the account number encrypted with the secret key, the EHA.  
The  SDP  validate  request  encrypted  session  message  is 
depicted in the Fig.5. Once it validates the SDP to be true then the 
session  existing  between  ATM  Terminal  and  the  agent  is  now 
transferred  smoothly  to  the  intended  financial  institutions 
application. Agent here acts as an authentication gateway and the 
financial  institutions  are  made  earlier  aware  about  the  agent 
application  and  therefore  accept  any  incoming  session  transfer 
request message from the agent and now session between agent 
and  ATM  terminal  terminates  and  between  that  of  bank 
application  and  terminal  begins.  This  session  transfer  request 
message  is  obtained  from  the  SDP  validate  request  encrypted 
session  message  after  SDP  validation  dropping  the  SDP  and 
encrypting again with EHA. 
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Fig.5. SDP Validate Request Encrypted Session Message 
The secret key is the Agent Ethernet Hardware address (EHA) 
for both bank application to accept the incoming session transfer 
request message from agent and encryption of session messages 
between  the  terminal  and  the  agent.  Identity  theft  (or  EHA 
spoofing) occurs when a cracker is able to listen in on network 
traffic and identify the EHA address of a computer with network 
privileges.  Most  wireless  systems  allow  some  kind  of  EHA 
filtering to allow only authorized computers  with  specific EHA 
IDs  to  gain  access  and  utilize  the  network.  EHA  filtering  is 
effective since it provides protection against the spoofing and also 
spoofing is local only to broadcast domain. The Secret key used 
therefore could be ensured to be a private key known only by the 
agent to decrypt the process. Also intra-terminal communication 
could  be  blocked  to  provide  additional  fold  of  security.  The 
account  number  sensed  from  the  ATM  terminal  along  with  the 
time stamp is encrypted with the EHA as the key and sent as a 
session  transfer  request  message  to  the  bank  application  which 
serves  as  self-authentication  of  agent  to  the  intended  financial 
institutions. From the Account number, it could now identify its 
respective financial institution. 
There are two separate repository designed, one the primary 
repository  acting  as  a  configured  warehouse  for  the  SDP 
generation  which  is  provided  by  the  financial  institutions 
comprising of the mobile number and the account number of the 
customer.  Second  repository  is  dynamic  in  nature  named  as 
secondary repository containing the account number, Branch code 
number and mobile number along with the SDP generated which 
helps in the session establishment between the bank application 
and the ATM terminal after bi-fold authentication mechanism is 
completed.  The  respective  account  entry  in  the  secondary 
repository  is  kept  active  for  exactly  five  minutes  from  the 
generation  of  the  SDP  and  updation  of  the  flag  in  the  primary 
repository  provided  by  the  financial  institutions  if  the  SDP 
mismatch  occurs  for  more  than  three  times  against  the  SDP 
generated or request for new SDP generation is made more than 
two  times  consecutively.  Both  the  respective  repositories  are 
maintained separately for each financial Institution.  
 
Fig.6. Session Transfer Request Message 
In  such  cases  the  suspect  for  fraudulent  action  is  sensed 
dynamically  and  the  corresponding  account  number  of  such 
happening is deactivated for next 24 hours denying any  further 
service. Also the update on the warehouse on behalf of request by 
financial  institutions  on  change  of  the  mobile  number  is  also 
entertained.  As  these  agent  repositories  does  not  have  the  PIN 
number associated with the ATM Card, the secrecy between the 
financial institution and the customer is not spoiled along with the 
dual-fold authentication also made possible. Also as sensing the 
fraudulent  activity  is  made  dynamic  associated  with  the  agent 
application, the financial institution  worry about the absence of 
completely authenticated transactions is therefore abolished. 
 
Fig.7. End-Decryption Module introduced in Existing System 
End-Decryption Module is the additional module need to be 
incorporated  into  the  current  existing  financial  institutions 
application.  This  module  has  in  the  repository,  the  Agent  EHA 
address - the secret key. It becomes more convenient as the agent 
can be proposed on the national basis and the norms of financial 
institutions are generally country - dependent. In this module, the 
decryption with the Agent EHA Address is facilitated and then the 
original message from the ATM terminal forwarded via agent is 
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obtained. Then the time  stamp is removed  which facilitates the 
PIN request (PIN that corresponds to the Account Number) from 
the customer from the ATM Terminal. Then PIN is validated and 
the session that is now existing between the ATM Terminal and 
financial institution comes into the picture. 
8. FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS 
Customer  must  be  given  an  ATM  card  by  the  financial 
institutions and can make use of it in the ATM terminal where the 
session first is established between the ATM terminal and trusted 
third part Agent. Thus the SPD generator generates as soon as the 
ATM card recognizing terminal recognizes the card as well as the 
agent  validates  the  account  number  and  the  customer  mobile  is 
sent with the SPD generated at the third party application. If the 
SPD is wrongly entered thrice or the request for new generation of 
SPD  exceeds  the  limit  allowed  the  corresponding  account  is 
temporarily blocked for 24 hours suspecting suspicious activities.  
Else only after the SPD validation, the existing mechanism of 
secure  session  establishment  between  bank  application  and  the 
ATM terminal happens and further transactions is facilitated. This 
mechanism also facilitates the complete removal of the fraudulent 
activity  of  usage  of  the  forged  ATM  cards  as  the  mobile  with 
respect to the forged ATM card is not available with them. This 
approach  also  prevents  additional  fraudulent  activities  of  eaves 
dropping as the session between the agent and the ATM Terminal 
is encrypted before the process of validation. The Fig.5 shows the 
functional flow of the entire proposed system. The flow between 
the current ATM Terminal and the Bank Application is separated 
now by a encrypted flow of session through the Agent to achieve a 
complete authentication phenomenon. 
 
Fig.8. Functional Flow in the Proposed System 
9. PHASES IN THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
One  Time  Session  Establishment  Before  a  transaction  takes 
place, one of the first things the ATM terminals must do is the 
establishment of a one Time session between the ATM terminal 
and the Agent. It includes the three message flows between the 
agent  and  the  ATM  terminal.  These  messages  are  Session 
Establishment  Handshake  Message,  SDP  Validate  Request 
Encrypted  Session  Message  and  the  Session  Transfer  Request 
Message. This is done by sending the first token of the ATM card 
account number along with exact time stamp encrypted with the 
Agent secret EHA Address so that agent can only decrypt it, as the 
EHA address of itself is maintained with high secrecy. The one-
time session establishment is helped in checking the authenticity 
of the user with the help of the agents. 
 
Fig.9. SDP Re-entry Request Message in One-Time Session 
Prior  to  it  all  the  ATM  terminals  are  loaded  with  the  EHA 
address  of  the  agent  and  refreshed  for  any  change.  On  the 
acceptance of the invalid SDP within the accepted limits a SDP 
Re-entry  request  message  is  sent  encrypted  with  the  secret  key 
with  the  respective  Account  Number  in  the  data  field  of  the 
message. 
 
Fig.10. One - Time Session Establishment 
Dynamic  Repository  Updation:  The  Process  of  repository 
updation is made twice once after the Generation of the SDP and 
other after the receipt of the SDP. Once the Session establishment 
handshake message is obtained, after the validation of the account 
number the SDP is generated which in turn adds an entry into the 
Dynamic Repository with account number, the SDP and the timer 
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along  with  the  two  limit  field  one  for  the  SDP  Regeneration 
request and other for the SDP Entry for validation. As soon as the 
Timer  expires  or  the  SDP  entry  or  the  Regeneration  Request 
exceeds the Limit enforced the flag in the primary repository is 
updated  else  the  session  transfer  request  message  is  generated 
deleting  the  corresponding  entry  of  account  number  from  the 
dynamic repository. 
 
Fig.11. Dynamic Repository Updation Process 
10.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Also  in  this  model  of  bi-fold  authentication  mechanism,  the 
SDP sent to the mobile could be entered from the mobile itself 
instead of entering it from the ATM Terminals by establishment of 
connection locally among registered mobile of the customer and 
ATM  Terminals.  Also  additional  prompt  could  be  made  after 
entering the SDP (such as the security questions) which could be 
randomly chosen from the repository to provide an additional level 
of authentication and this could also be asked to be entered from 
the  mobile.  The  bi-fold  authentication  mechanisms  could  be 
adopted  also  as  a  part  of  different  phases  before  the  session 
between  the  ATM  terminal  and  the  bank  application  is  being 
established  and  after  this  session  establishment  and  Personal 
identification Number Entry into the terminal so that fraudulent 
action at its next level could also be assured with integrity of the 
data  also  being  maintained.  Any  other  techniques  like  the 
Biometric  [4]  verification  at  the  ATM  terminal  at  lower  cost, 
economical and at the expense of lesser energy requirement could 
also be devised along with double tier authentication phenomenon. 
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